Introduction In 1998, a multidisciplinary team of investigators initiated the Research on Adverse Drug events And Reports (RADAR) project, a post-marketing surveillance effort that systematically investigates and disseminates information describing serious and previously unrecognized serious adverse drug and device reactions (sADRs). Objective Herein, we describe the findings, dissemination efforts, and lessons learned from the first decade of the RADAR project. Methods After identifying serious and unexpected clinical events suitable for further investigation, RADAR collaborators derived case information from physician queries, published and unpublished clinical trials, case reports, US FDA databases and manufacturer sales figures.
Conclusion An independent National Institutes of Healthfunded post-marketing surveillance programme can supplement existing regulatory and pharmaceutical manufacturer-supported drug safety initiatives.
Introduction
Most pharmacovigilance efforts rely on governmental agencies, such as the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the pharmaceutical industry to identify serious adverse drug reactions (sADRs). Adverse Event Reporting System (FAERS), an FDA database, depends on voluntary reporting, making it susceptible to under-reporting, incomplete reporting, over-reporting and absent epidemiological data. Indeed, the definition of sADRs often generates significant over-reporting of events as does the de facto voluntary reporting of these events. Regulations also mandate that manufacturers forward adverse events reports to the FDA. Other potential sources of safety data, such as electronic files maintained by insurers, health maintenance organizations or the Department of Veterans Affairs, are not publicly available. The Institute of Medicine has therefore called for new drug safety approaches [1] , but independent investigators are frequently overlooked when these approaches become tangible initiatives.
The Research on Adverse Drug Reactions And Reports (RADAR) project is a clinically based academic postmarketing surveillance programme. RADAR bears no relation to RAD-AR, Risk Assessment of Drugs-Analysis and Response, a programme initiated in 1989 under the aegis of the pharmaceutical industry and academia. RAD-AR developed a worldwide catalogue of databases that was recruited for drug safety research (the so-called RAD-AR Data Resource Handbooks); these have since been digitally modernized and are classified as the BRIDGE-to-DATA initiative (http://www.bridgetodata.org) [2, 3] . During the decade of our RADAR's funding by the National Institutes of Health, RADAR comprised a multidisciplinary team of investigators from various disciplines (basic science, immunology, clinical medicine, epidemiology, statistics, pharmacovigilance, haematology, oncology and clinical pharmacology). The programme systematically investigates and disseminates information describing serious and previously unrecognized adverse drug and device reactions (ADRs), 43 being reported since 1998. The overarching goals of the programme are to identify, evaluate and disseminate reports on sADRs (Tables 1, 2) , thus improving patient safety primarily within the domain of cancer care. Herein, we summarize RADAR's findings, lessons learned and future implications.
Methods
When an unexpected clinical event (a signal) representing a possible sADR is identified by a RADAR co-investigator, RADAR collaborators postulate clinical hypotheses and derive case series and incidence estimates from physician queries, published and unpublished clinical trials, published case reports, FDA databases and manufacturer sales figures [4, 5] . Collaborators also review the relevant package inserts. Institutional Review Board (IRB) requests are submitted at collaborating institutions when patient health information is required. Relevant FDA reports, usually received within 3 weeks of request, are preliminarily reviewed to specifically generate hypotheses related to the ADR of interest. During weekly meetings, investigators adapt case classification forms to the sADR being investigated. The case classification forms include generic core data elements comprising patient demographics (e.g. age, sex), information source (e.g. clinical trial, physician queries), concomitant medication history, event description (e.g. date of the event, time elapsed between exposure and ADR event, event duration, other relevant history, physical finding, study results), organ-specific history, and treatments (e.g. hospitalization, medications). World Health Organization Uppsala Monitoring Centre (WHO-UMC) criteria [6] are used to score causal associations (certain, probable, possible, unlikely, conditional and unassessable) for each case between the suspect drug and the event. A sample of cases is reviewed by the RADAR team, followed by refinement of hypotheses relative to the pathophysiology of the ADR of interest. Syndromespecific case report forms are populated with information relevant to the hypotheses and experience from the preliminary case review. Data elements and coding are chosen to accommodate the range of data available in the FDA reports and also to address the underlying hypotheses about the specific type of ADR. Coding of the case classification form is designed to facilitate algorithmic analysis of case findings and case-based causality assessments.
There are 31 core investigators on the RADAR team, comprising two haematologist/oncologists, three health services researchers, three internists, one emergency medicine physician, and various medical subspecialties, including two geriatricians, two bone health experts, one infectious disease physician, two neurologists, two dermatologists, one clinical pharmacologist, four radiologists, two statisticians, two attorneys, two nephrologists and two pharmacists. These core investigators are located at academic medical centres in Chicago, IL; Albuquerque, NM; Rochester, MN; New Haven, CT; and Leuven, Belgium. RADAR sometimes recruits other co-investigators with relevant expertise for a specific sADR. RADAR convenes weekly in-person meetings at Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine in Chicago and Investigators identify additional data sources, such as individual cases or a series of patients with the suspected ADR. Data sources include abstracts or peer-reviewed manuscripts describing published clinical trials and queries of physicians at medical centres treating large numbers of patients with the relevant drug or those receiving treatment for the suspected ADR. Additionally, representatives of clinical research and drug safety at the relevant pharmaceutical firms and safety officials at the FDA and other federal organizations are asked to provide case reports. Investigators abstract the information from individual cases and enter it into a relational database. RADAR has created a system to systematically report ADRs to national databases. The involved databases include the FAERs, the FDA-Centers for Disease Control (CDC)'s FDA Adverse Event Reporting System, which is a national passive voluntary reporting system that accepts reports from the public on adverse events associated with vaccines licensed in the USA, and the National Registry of Drug-Induced Ocular Side Effects, a clearinghouse and reporting entity for drug information on ocular toxicology and suspected adverse drug reactions. Recently, in the area of nephrogenic systemic sclerosis (NSF) secondary to gadolinium-based contrast material (GBCM), RADAR mined a public legal dataset not normally accessed by the medical community.
Hierarchical ordering for case inclusion has been developed: published case report, unpublished case report, and the FAERS or Manufacturer and User Facility Device Experience (MAUDE) system. In order to determine whether an adverse event is drug specific or represents a class effect, hypotheses-based pathophysiological causes are pursued and identified by clinical pharmacologists. Subsequently, specialists in diverse disciplines collaborate based on their expertise and familiarity with the ADRs under study.
Results

Primary Data Sources
The source of data by which the association was first identified included patient registries (specifically cancer registries), clinical trial reports, case reports and medical registries (Table 1) . Medical or patient registries are collections of secondary data related to patients with a specific diagnosis, condition or procedure that play an important role in post-marketing surveillance of pharmaceuticals. Registry data were the primary data source for five sADRs. These sADRs were reported between 1 and 12 years after FDA approval of the drug (median 2 years). Sixteen acute myeloid leukaemia (AML) cases were identified in a population-based registry of cancer cases (the Surveillance Epidemiology and End Results [SEER] Registry) developed by RADAR. This information was merged with Medicare records to generate an incidence estimate of 1.8 % of AML/myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS) among chemotherapy-treated breast cancer patients following granulocyte colony stimulating factor/granulocyte macrophage colony stimulating factor (G-CSF/GM-CSF) administration, versus 1 % among chemotherapy-treated breast cancer patients not receiving chemotherapy or G-CSF/GM-CSF (hazard rate of 2.14 [95 % CI 1.12-4.08]) [7] . A second investigation launched by RADAR examined thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura (TTP) following clopidogrel or ticlopidine initiation [8, 9] , and relied on logs maintained by directors of plasmapheresis centres. Review of the FAERS/MedWatch reports data by RADAR investigators also determined that the purported adverse event of calcium-ceftriaxone drug embolization in adults did not likely exist and likely does not cause end organ damage [10] . While we utilized the Common Terminology Criteria for Adverse Events (CTCAE version 3) categories, a standardized classification of side effects used in assessing drugs for cancer therapy, we did not actually assess drug causality, but rather the likelihood that specific clinical events (e.g. renal failure) were related to the adverse event (e.g. embolism) of interest. This method of analysis is not validated and does not follow usual pharmacovigilance practices. While this study did not predate package insert changes by the FDA, our results reinforced the revised FDA recommendations that patients [28 days old may receive ceftriaxone and calcium sequentially and provided a transparent and reproducible methodology for such evaluations. Clinical trial reports were the primary data sources for 13 sADRs reported within a time period ranging from shortly after FDA approval to as late as 18 years post-approval (median: 3 years). These reports included phase II trials (sinusoidal obstructive syndrome [SOS] following gemtuzumab) and phase III trials (mortality and venous thromboembolism [VTE] with epoetin or darbepoetin use in cancer patients and VTE with thalidomide and lenalidomide) [11, 19] .
Case reports provided primary data sources for 17 sADRs; time to sADR reporting ranged from immediately after FDA approval (ticlopidine) to 26 years (median: 7.5 years). For most of these sADRS, initial safety reports were submitted to peer-reviewed journals, but not to the FDA or drug manufacturers. Clinicians at referral centres provided information for eight sADRs. Reporting of these sADRs ranged from immediately after FDA approval to 5 years post (median: 2 years). In several instances, clinicians reported the original case information directly to RADAR, but not to the FDA or the manufacturers. In turn, RADAR de-identified the case reports and submitted the clinical information to the FDA and the respective manufacturers.
Data Quality
The quality of safety data in registries is often poor and constrained by funding limitations. A RADAR study that focused on adverse drug events (ADE) reporting to IRBs at 49 National Cancer Institute (NCI)-designated cancer centres, confirmed that the validity of information regarding drug toxicity in humans is dependent on the quality of the methods and instruments used to assess ADEs [12] . Compared with global introspection, the use of a validated tool to describe and assess event type, severity, and causality augurs well for more timely and accurate identification of safety signals in the domain of cancer therapy. RADAR therefore developed checklists that included information on history, physical examination, laboratory tests, basic science, treatment, clinical outcomes, prophylaxis and causality assessments to evaluate database quality [5] . RADAR safety-focused databases, such as the SERF-TTP (Surveillance, Epidemiology, Risk Factors-Thrombotic Thrombocytopenia Purpura) and the Tysabri Outreach Unified Commitment to Health, include this information [13] . For clopidogrel-and ticlopidine-associated TTP, case reports included ADAMTS13-metalloprotease activity levels, facilitating evaluations of pathophysiological mechanisms [13, 14] . Our review identified 45 % completeness rates for history and physical examination information, 46 % for laboratory studies and 3 % for basic science studies versus completion rates of 90 %, 54 % and 34 %, respectively, in RADAR databases [5] ; poor completeness emanates from the voluntary nature of adverse event reporting [15, 16] . FDA reports do not include information on specific product types (for sADRs involving pharmaceutical classes) pathology, treatment or outcome. AERS was utilized to evaluate pure red cell aplasia (PRCA) following epoetin administration in chronic kidney disease (CKD) patients (n = 170 cases) and NSF post-magnetic resonance angiography with gadolinium (n = 351 cases) [17, 18] ; relevant individual case reports for these two sADRs were incomplete, often lacking information about which epoetin or gadolinium product had been administered.
A meta-analysis of 51 phase III trials for cancer patients identified a statistically significant 1.10-fold increased risk of mortality and a 1.57-fold increased VTE risk with erythropoietin-stimulating agents (ESAs) [19] . A meta-analysis of individual patient data identified a statistically significant 1.17-fold increased mortality risk. In several reports, incidence estimates were based on numbers of cases identified by RADAR (numerator data) and estimates of numbers of unique users based on marketing data (denominator data) [8, 20] ; recently, a case-control study provided information on odds for developing clopidogrelassociated TTP [21] .
Dissemination
Four sADRs were published by RADAR investigators as case histories. These reports described G-CSF-associated acute leukaemia occurring among three donors of peripheral stem cells, lymphoproliferative diseases among two volunteers who received megakaryocyte growth and development factor, fulminant hepatitis among two healthcare workers after receiving 2 weeks of nevirapine for post-HIV exposure from needle sticks, and a pancreas/ kidney transplant patient developing a thrombotic microangiopathy after receiving several days of clopidogrel [14, 22, 23] . Thirty-two sADRs were summarized as case series or summary reviews [5, 8, 9, 15, 16, 20, 21, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] . For 17 sADR case series, comparisons of quality of adverse event data illustrated that case information in FDA databases were markedly less complete than similar case reports in RADAR databases [5] .
Recognizing that sADR incidence rates are context specific, data tables report rates as a function of concomitant drugs and extent of disease (e.g. thalidomide-associated VTE and gemtuzumab-associated SOS) [4, 34] ; for epoetin-associated PRCA, a graph displayed exposureadjusted incidence rates over time for different formulations and among different countries [15, 35] sADR information was disseminated widely. For 22 sADRs, findings were presented at meetings initiated by RADAR to pharmaceutical suppliers at their corporate headquarters; conversely, additional cases were sometimes described by the manufacturer to the RADAR team.
Brief reports were disseminated for 24 sADRs; seven were published in high-impact general medical journals and 18 in specialty journals. Half of RADAR publications appeared as peer-reviewed articles within 2 years after pharmaceutical manufacturers described these sADRs in 'Dear Healthcare Professional' letters or package-insert revisions. Incident to these peer-reviewed articles were summary reports from RADAR that were placed on websites maintained by Consumer's Union, the Veterans Administration MedSafe Project (a patient safety centre of inquiry) and Northwestern University's MedRADAR site. These summary reports provided very timely access to the information that subsequently appeared in peer-reviewed reports.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers described 23 RADARidentified sADRs (a part of the 43 ADRs mentioned in this report) in 'Dear Healthcare Professional' letters (nine sADRs) or revisions to the FDA-approved package inserts (14 sADRs). For thalidomide-associated VTE, Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal filed a 31-page Citizen Petition in 2005, triggered by a RADAR poster. In the USA, a Citizen Petition allows any person to request the FDA Commissioner to ''issue, amend, revoke a regulation or order or take or refrain from taking any other form of administration action'' subject to the Commissioner's statutory authority. In the thalidomide case, the Attorney General raised concerns about ADRs in off-label settings (a RADAR haematologist had reported a 25 % VTE rate when thalidomide was given with doxorubicin or dexamethasone, specifically noting that thalidomide, which was then approved to treat a rare illness, was being used offlabel in more than 90 % of cases) [36] . The Attorney General subsequently requested six safety-related actions for manufacturer consideration. This was the fourth Citizen Petition filed with the FDA by a State Attorney General and the second to be filed with the FDA by Blumenthal. One year later, the FDA approved four of the six recommendations in the petition, including a request to include the related safety information in the 'boxed' warning section of the package insert.
Discussion
Lessons Learned
After a decade of pharmacovigilance studies, we can offer ten major lessons learned.
First, though observant clinicians play critical roles in identifying the first instances of several sADRs, they are frequently reluctant to forward summary information to the FDA or to pharmaceutical manufacturers. Indeed, it is estimated that only 1-10 % of ADRs are reported to the FDA [37] . For several sADRs, clinicians submitted case histories to medical journals for publication consideration, but did not forward the same reports to the FDA or the manufacturer. In interviews with these providers, stated barriers to report submission included concerns about follow-on requests for updated information and clarification of the original case information; fear that reporting might jeopardize collaborative relationships with the pharmaceutical manufacturers; uncertainty related to association between the clinical event and the particular drug [38] ; time limitations; and litigation fears. The MedWatch form states that ''The public reporting burden for this collection of information has been estimated to average 30 min per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.'' It is also well settled that many physicians are concerned about litigation by their patients or third parties. In a 1992 survey of physicians regarding adverse event reporting, more than 37 % of those responding to the survey agreed with the statement that reporting increases the risk of litigation involvement; 18 % listed fear of involvement in the administrative or legal process as a significant factor for not reporting serious ADRs [39, 40] . Similar concerns, reported by the National Registry of Drug-Induced Ocular Side Effects, dissipated once investigators obtained a certificate of confidentiality from the Oregon State Attorney General [41] .
Second, obtaining adverse event reports from MedWatch requires patience. Requests are processed under the Freedom of Information Act and can take years. Furthermore, many pieces of useful clinical information are still not included; in the past, age and sex were redacted, but are now retained. Allowing appropriately vetted investigators timely access to MedWatch information could improve its usefulness. RADAR investigations proceed at an accelerated pace due to both facility in accessing the FAERS and collaboration with expert navigators of the AERS database [42] .
Third, quality 'trumps' quantity. While large numbers are needed for rare events, for most of the individual sADRs, RADAR case series include description of fewer than 100 cases. Conversely, pharmacovigilance initiatives by the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers focus on mining large data sets-many of which have compromised quality. Pharmaceutical manufacturers are beginning to adopt computer-based disproportionality analysis in an effort to expedite signal detection, but greater effort is needed. Future pharmacovigilance pilot efforts should focus on obtaining comprehensive adverse event reporting from a small number of sentinel sites, such as referral centres.
Fourth, product liability attorneys are untapped information sources, some of which might be credible. Twentythree law firms developed a large and comprehensive database of cases of gadolinium-associated NSF. The database includes information on specific gadolinium brands-an important element not included in FDA reports. In a novel initiative, RADAR received approval to review these individual medical records and to submit these findings for peer review [43, 44] .
Fifth, safety notification dissemination is uncoordinated and often conflicting. For example, advisories from medical organizations, the FDA, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) and pharmaceutical manufacturers include different estimates of the underlying cause, incidence and recommendations for prevention and treatment of bisphosphonate-associated osteonecrosis of the jaw [32] . RADAR researchers previously noted that manufacturer-sponsored epidemiological studies reported the first estimates of the incidence of osteonecrosis of the jaw, ranging from 0.1 % to 1.8 %. By contrast, independent epidemiological efforts from clinicians and the International Myeloma Foundation reported incidence estimates between 5 % and 10 % [32] ; this lack of coordination slowed dissemination efforts relative to this serious ADR. Similarly, EMA classifies GBCM into low-and high-risk compounds, while the FDA considers all GBCMs to pose a similar risk for NSF. While inconsistencies in the nature and amount of information provided and in methods of dissemination exist, Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS) mandated by the FDA and EMA have resulted in more consistent standards and have potentially improved drug safety.
Sixth, sharing safety findings with drug manufacturers facilitates information exchange. RADAR routinely shares findings from its investigations with pharmaceutical companies. In-person meetings with pharmaceutical company epidemiologists to facilitate development of collaborative prospective safety studies have also been convened, but no proposals have been funded to date.
Seventh, manufacturers, regulatory authorities, insurers and clinicians tend to react to safety reports. These responses include 'boxed' warnings, public health advisories and/or review of findings at advisory meetings or by guideline committees. RADAR provided Attorney General Blumenthal with thalidomide-associated thromboembolism material in response to concerns about anaemic dissemination to providers and the public. For erythropoietin and darbepoetin, responses included recommendations by the manufacturer not to administer these agents to cancer patients receiving chemotherapy with curative intent. Ultimately, use of these agents throughout the oncology community decreased by 80 %, primarily due to safety concerns. For rituximab, the FDA denied a request to extend the licensed indication to first-line treatment of rheumatoid arthritis because of safety concerns resulting from identification of several cases of progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML) among individuals receiving this drug.
Eighth, safety is a 'life-long' concern. Several sADRs were identified 1-2 decades after commonly used drugs received regulatory approval; these include epoetin-associated PRCA, VTE; ticlopidine-associated TTP, and rituximab-associated PML [15, 33, 45] .
Ninth, class-related toxicities should be anticipated. Awareness of sADRs associated with ticlopidine, thalidomide and nilutamide facilitated identification of similar toxicities with clopidogrel, lenalidomide and flutamide/bicalutamide, respectively. Anticipation of these toxicities was helpful in early identification of these sADRs.
Finally, reporting safety assessments can be controversial. RADAR presentations describing increased mortality among cancer patients who received erythropoietin or darbepoetin and PML following rituximab treatment were viewed as particularly dissentious, as the results were not embraced by clinicians or readily accepted by manufacturers. Additional investigations conducted by the relevant pharmaceutical manufacturers eventually supported RADAR's findings with resultant changes in product labelling [33, 46, 47] ; this controversy underscores the importance of partnering proactively with relevant stakeholders (e.g. pharmaceutical companies) in the pursuit of ADRs. Furthermore, it highlighted the importance of communicating with providers and manufacturers that the goal of surveillance is not always to remove an efficacious drug product from the market, but often to support its continued use within the constraints of specific indications, dosage, co-use with other drug products, and use by well informed (through product insert and direct-to-consumer advertisements) providers and patients.
Looking Forward
In May 2008, the FDA launched the Sentinel Initiative. A proactive national electronic system involving electronic health records, administrative and insurance claims databases, and registries, Sentinel, like RADAR, is designed to augment already existing safety surveillance systems.
In addition to Sentinel and in concert with its expanded powers under Title IX of the FDA Amendments Act (FDAAA) of 2007, 49 the FDA approved the class-wide REMS programme for ESAs [49, 50] ; this REMS requires physicians and hospitals using ESAs for cancer-related anaemia to register and undergo training relative to their risks and benefits. The FDAAA provides a new statutory framework and authority for the FDA to require REMS for drugs and biologics either prior to approval relative to a risk-benefit analysis or post-approval based on new safety information [48] .
Limitations to RADAR's approach must still be acknowledged. Dissemination of ADR data by pharmaceutical suppliers and the FDA continues to be evaluated based on reviews of package inserts and 'Dear Healthcare Professional' letters, these being the only relevant sources of safety information from a regulatory perspective. While several of the major proposed changes alluded to in our previous manuscript in 2005 have come to fruition, large databases often are not mined in contradistinction to RADAR-related investigations. RADAR is also limited in that it does not address non-serious ADRs, seeking instead to focus on serious and/or life-threatening adverse events; consequently, RADAR's range is arguably limited. Over a period of 7 years, RADAR investigated 16 serious ADRs utilizing 25 investigators in parallel with the FDA, which reviewed more than 900,000 reports and contributed to at least 1,500 safety-related labelling changes with the support of a large team of investigators and a multi-million dollar budget [51] .
In conclusion, the RADAR programme has adapted an approach to adverse event assessment originally proposed in the context of systematic reviews [52] . Data sources include clinical trials, referral centres and databases and registries-sources with varied data quality. Incidence estimation is challenging, with registries and observational databases providing information for sADRs with low incidences. A range of data synthesis and dissemination efforts has been utilized, involving non-profit organizations, medical journals, regulatory agencies, the private sector and the medical community. New partnerships have been established with organizations such as the Consumer's Union [53] , trade journals and the Veterans Affairs MedSafe programme [54] . We have demonstrated that our method complements traditional surveillance efforts conducted by the FDA and pharmaceutical manufacturers and provides support for including independent programmes in public-private safety collaborations.
